The thought of the ancient atomists about the activity of the soul in the body is an important chapter in the history of reflection on the soul in ancient philosophy. A review of testimonies and fragments attributed to Democritus of Abdera shows its singular conception of the soul as a complex network of transactions through which it exercises, inside compound bodies, its role in driving principle of beings animated. These texts show the tension and dynamism that characterize the activity of (...) the soul and especially the close relationship between the activities of perceiving and thinking, essential activities to the economy of living beings, now for what is the management of biological life, now in terms of knowledge and human action. What we propose here is to examine how Democritus conceived the activity of the soul in its complexity and the various operations through which it accomplishes its function in the animation and the maintenance of life of animate beings, and particularly of human life. To do this, we will take as a basis the testimonies referred to the nature of the soul – especially the testimony of Aristotle and his disciples and commentators – and then examine the activities through which proceeds its role of motor principle, namely the sensations and the intellection. And, finally, we intend to demonstrate that these operations should not be considered, in the context of atomist thought, as two independent and opposed faculties or activities, but as two different levels or degree, contiguous and complementary, of one and the same activity. (shrink)

The thought of the ancient atomists about the activity of the soul in the body is an important chapter in the history of reflection on the soul in ancient philosophy. A review of testimonies and fragments attributed to Democritus of Abdera shows its singular conception of the soul as a complex network of transactions through which it exercises, inside compound bodies, its role in driving principle of beings animated. These texts show the tension and dynamism that characterize the activity of (...) the soul and especially the close relationship between the activities of perceiving and thinking, essential activities to the economy of living beings, now for what is the management of biological life, now in terms of knowledge and human action. What we propose here is to examine how Democritus conceived the activity of the soul in its complexity and the various operations through which it accomplishes its function in the animation and the maintenance of life of animate beings, and particularly of human life. To do this, we will take as a basis the testimonies referred to the nature of the soul – especially the testimony of Aristotle and his disciples and commentators – and then examine the activities through which proceeds its role of motor principle, namely the sensations and the intellection. And, finally, we intend to demonstrate that these operations should not be considered, in the context of atomist thought, as two independent and opposed faculties or activities, but as two different levels or degree, contiguous and complementary, of one and the same activity. (shrink)

« La mesure est le plus grand des biens » et « rien de trop » apparaissent dans les sentences attribuées aux Sept Sages de l’Antiquité Grecque. Elles font état d’une sagesse qui blâme l’excès et invite à la modération. Les échos de ces propos résonnent dans différentes périodes de l’Antiquité et chez des auteurs appartenant aux traditions les plus variées, parmi lesquels se trouve notamment Démocrite. Nombreux sont en effet les fragments qui attestent de sa condamnation des excès, de (...) sa réflexion critique sur les richesses et de son éloge de la modération et de l’équilibre entendus comme conditions du bien-être et de l’action bonne. « La juste proportion est belle en toutes choses » (DK 68 B 102), proclame le philosophe. Cette juste proportion est érigée en condition pour atteindre la « bonne humeur » ( euthymiê ) et le « bien-être » ( euestô ). La réflexion de Démocrite se fonde sur une sorte de principe économique qui s’exprime par la notion de « mesure » ( metriotês ). La capacité à être modéré est aussi le signe distinctif de l’être humain bien accompli (DK 68 B 70), et s’oppose aux différentes formes de l’avidité. Lorsque l’on examine les fragments qui traitent de ce sujet, l’on constate que le philosophe a dressé un inventaire qui prend en compte les domaines les plus divers de la vie. Il est en effet question de la mesure aussi bien dans le cadre des affections comme le plaisir et le désir, que dans celui de la satisfaction de nos besoins élémentaires. Il en est également question pour ce qui est de notre attitude à l’égard des biens matériels et des richesses. Dans cet article nous avons choisi de faire porter l’attention sur la réflexion du philosophe sur les richesses et les biens matériels, en prenant tout particulièrement en compte sa mise en cause du désir dans l’économie de la vie humaine. Classification JEL : B1. (shrink)